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CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Sebastian Kubas
The scope and application of the terms of the United States Con-
J_ stitution to private conduct is generally perceived in the context 
of the so-called state action doctrine invented by the Supreme Court 
in the late 19th century. It can be argued that, at first sight, the US 
Constitution is not applicable to relations between private indivi­
duals, the only exception being the Thirteenth Amendment which 
states that “[njeither slavery nor involuntary servitude (... ) shall exist 
within the United States. " This ban on slavery ratified in 1865 was 
clearly aimed for the „utter and complete extirpation” of slavery so 
not only was government-sanctioned slavery prohibited but also pri­
vate types of domination. 1
1 A. R. Amar, America’s Constitution. A Biography, New York 2006, pp. 358- 
360. 
The main constitutional ground for the assessment of the Con­
stitution’s effectiveness among private persons is the Fourteenth 
Amendment which contains the following language in section 1: “No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec­
tion of the laws. ” The Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 banned private 
racial discrimination but the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases 
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(1883) found those provisions unconstitutional. The Court narrowly 
read the Fourteenth Amendment and declared that the first section 
of this Amendment, which was the one relied on in Congress, is 
prohibitory upon the States. "It is State action of a particular char­
acter that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual right is not 
subject-matter of the amendment. "2 As Erwin Chemerinsky puts it, 
“The Civil Rights Cases, in 1883, are generally credited with mandating 
the requirement for state action. (... ) The central holding of the Civil 
Righs Cases — that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the 
government, not to private conduct — remains the law and is a cen­
tral principle of constitutional law. ”3
2 109 U. S. 3 (1883). 
’ E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law. Principles and Policies, New York 
2006, pp. 507-508 (Aspen Treatise Series). 
4 334 U. S. 1 (1948). 
5 E. Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action", Northwestern University Law 
Review, Vol. 80, No. 3 (Fall 1985), p. 507. 
The requirement or doctrine of state action is central to the ap­
plicability of the Constitution to private relations. According to this 
requirement, purely private behavior does not need to comply with 
the Constitution. This rule was reiterated many times by the Court 
for instance in the Shelley v. Kraemer decision where the Court ex­
plicitly articulated that since the Civil Rights Cases “the principle has 
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action 
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only 
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amend­
ment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis­
criminatory or wrongful. ”4 There were some earlier decisions before 
1883 in which a similar approach was used. Chemerinsky points 
to United States v. Cruikshank (1875) where the Court said that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not add anything to the rights which 
one citizen has under the Constitution against another. 5 David M. 
O’Brien quotes Ex Parte Virginia (1880), the case in which a Virginia 
judge was charged with violating federal law for excluding blacks 
from juries. The judge countered that because the state had no law 
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excluding blacks from juries, his actions though official did not con­
stitute “state action. ”6 It is however Justice Bradley’s opinion in Civil 
Rights Cases that is used and discussed in dozens of Court’s decision 
from the 19th century till present. Naturally, the doctrine radiates to 
the whole judiciary. In 2008 Julie K. Brown wrote: “Lower courts are 
currently struggling with the state action doctrine not because of lack 
of guidance from the United States Supreme Court, but because the 
lower courts are under the heavy burden of weighing such a fact-de­
pendent matter against the host of state action tests handed down by 
the Supreme Court. ’’7
6 D. M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, Vol. 2: Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, New York 2011, p. 1395. 
7 J. K. Brown, “Less is More. Decluttering the State Action Doctrine", Missouri 
Law Review, Vol. 73, Issue 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 561, 572. 
8 F. M. Ugarte, "Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil 
Rights Cases", Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 41 (Summer 
2006), p. 481. 
9 R. J. Cottrol, “Civil Rights Cases” in K. L. Hall (ed. ), The Oxford Guide to 
United States Supreme Court Decisions, Oxford 2000, p. 56. 
Actually, as Francisco M. Ugarte stresses, the Civil Rights Cases, 
that were affirmed in United States v. Morrison in 2000, are among 
the few Jim Crow cases that remain good law. 8 It should also be not­
ed that this seminal decision from 1883 “fashioned a Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence considerably less protective of individual 
rights than many of its framers had envisioned” and it also “largely 
mandated the withdrawal of the federal government from civil rights 
enforcement. ”9 In fact, after the failure of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
Congress waited almost 90 years before it passed another major 
anti-discrimination piece of legislation, that is the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, this time under the Commerce Clause. 
As shown above, the dominant view of the Court is that the pri­
vate infringements of constitutional rights are outside its jurisdiction. 
The state action doctrine requires that the wrongful conduct of pri­
vate individuals has some connection to state authority to be action­
able under the Fourteenth Amendment. Some kind of nexus to the 
state or entanglement must be shown to allow the Court to reach the 
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merits of a case. This requirement refers to the government’s activity 
at any level: the state level, but also the federal one. It is then the 
state/governmental involvement that makes the state responsible for 
the wrongful activity. If the state action is found the court orders the 
state only to disengage itself from the challenged activity so without 
the state’s involvement the activity may be continued. 10
10 E. Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action", p. 541. 
11 419 U-S-345 (1974)·
12 See also M. A. Graber, “Subtraction by Addition? The Thirteenth and Four­
teenth Amendments”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 112, No. 7 (2012), p. 1505; 
H. Hershkoff, “Horizontality and the ‘Spooky’ Doctrines of American Law”, 
Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 59 (2011), p. 504. 
13 457 U. S. 922 (1982). 
The Court has stated and restated the state action doctrine many 
times. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974)11 the Court im­
posed a strict state action requirement on equal protection and due 
process claims. In this decision, because this requirement had not 
been met, the Court offered no remedy against a private utility that 
terminated electric service to a customer without prior notice. 12 The 
Justices reminded that they had found state action present in the ex­
ercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved 
to the State. However, they rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
a private utility like Metropolitan Edison Company performs pub­
lic function, although it is heavily regulated and is enjoying at least 
a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its 
territory. The majority of the Justices (6: 3) decided that supplying of 
utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. 
Well-established usage of the state action doctrine caused its 
typical consolidation and a kind of reluctant veneration for it. In 1982 
the Court (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ) declared in 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. careful adherence to the state action re­
quirement and remarked: “Whether this is good or bad policy, it is 
a fundamental fact of our political order. ”13
However, as it is usually the case with judicial inventions, the 
state action doctrine and the meaning of the Reconstruction Amend- 
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merits has been neither uniformly understood nor consistently ap­
plied by the Justices. The notion of a “fact” is therefore rather exag­
gerated in this context. In the first 80 years the impact of the Justices’ 
understanding of these Amendments was more far-reaching than 
later on. In the Civil Rights Cases opinion in 1883 the Court not only 
limited its own jurisdiction but also greatly limited the Congress’s 
power to regulate private conduct under the Reconstruction Amend­
ments (Amendments XIII, XIV and XV). The Court declared that the 
Thirteenth Amendment applies to private conduct but the Congress’s 
power was limited to ensuring an end to slavery, that is to abolish 
“all badges and incidents of slavery. ” The federal legislation based on 
the Thirteenth Amendment could not go further and regulate acts of 
private discrimination. The Court adjudged that under the authority 
given by the Thirteenth Amendment the Congress could not adjust 
"the social rights of men and races in the community. ” As mentioned 
above, the Court also declared that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
not authorized the Congress to establish such regulations. In 1968 
the Court changed its position on the Congress’s powers. In Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968) the Court accepted the view that un­
der the Thirteenth Amendment Congress is allowed to prohibit pri­
vate racial discrimination. 14 In recent years there has even been a re­
newed emphasis on the Thirteenth Amendment, “inspired, in part, 
by a sense that the Fourteenth Amendment may be a weaker reed 
for protecting fundamental rights. ”15 It should also be noted that one 
can argue the Jones decision is in serious tension with the more re­
cent City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) decision that offers a substantial­
ly more restrictive standard for evaluating congressional legislation. 16
14 See extended discussion in E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, pp. 288- 
293. 
15 M. A. Graber, "Subtraction by Addition?... ”, p. 1505. In the conclusion of 
his paper M. A. Graber states that it is doubtful whether the Thirteenth Amend­
ment revivalism has the potential to end the long period of racial stagnation in 
the United States. 
16 See J. M. McAward, “The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment En­
forcement Power After City of Boeme v. Flores”, Washington University Law Re­
view, Vol. 88, Issue 1 (2010), p. 77. 
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The state action doctrine was also given many new twists in the 
jurisprudence of the Court. All this is very well summarized by David 
M. O’Brien. In the 1940s and 1950s the Court took a leading role in 
the process of ending racial segregation. In an otherwise important 
decision, Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the state action doctrine became, 
in the words of D. M. O’Brien, “a tool for the Court to reach and ban 
private racial discrimination. ” The significance of the doctrine was 
substantially weakened. For two decades after the Shelley decision 
the Court did not deny a relief because of the perceived absence of 
state action. Following Richard Nixon’s win to the Presidency, Chief 
Justice Burger’s Court and later Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Court 
introduced many changes to the doctrine. The scope of it was nar­
rowed which led to the enlargement of the range of private activities 
immune from suits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally 
the Court dismissed arguments for extending the doctrine of state 
action. 17 An example of this approach is the Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis (1972) decision. A guest of a private club, Moose Lodge, was 
refused service because of his skin color. He sought an injunction 
to revoke the club’s license to sell liquor until it ceased its discrim­
inatory practices. The state liquor license issued to the club was the 
plaintiff’s argument that the state action requirement was satisfied. 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s verdict and ruled 
against the black guest (“a Negro, ” as he was called in Justice Rehn­
quist’s opinion). The Justices concluded that “Moose Lodge’s refusal 
to serve food and beverages to a guest by reason of the fact that he 
was a Negro does not (... ) violate the Fourteenth Amendment. ” Ac­
cording to the Justices there was no state action because there was no 
suggestion “that the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations governing 
the sale of liquor are intended either overtly or covertly to encour­
age discrimination. ’’18 This way the racial discrimination issue was 
not discussed for the state action doctrine allowed the Court not to 
reach the merits of the case. In his critical assessment of this opinion 
17 See O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, Vol. 2, pp. 1397-1406. 
18 407 U. S. 163 (1972). 
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Odilon Castello Borges Neto aptly stated: “When the United States 
Supreme Court affirms that a private discriminatory policy may not 
be outlawed, it is indeed supporting such an invidious conduct, at 
least, indirectly. ”19
19 O. C. Borges Neto, "Is the State Action Requirement Really Necessary? 
A Comparative Study Between the American and the Brazilian Systems of Fun­
damental Rights Protection”, Revista Jurídica Universidad de Puerto Rico, Vol. 75, 
No. 3 (2006), pp. 805, 856. 
20 E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, pp. 510-513.
21 L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law as Fiction. Narrative in Rhetoric of Authority, 
University Park 1995, p. 120.
It is possible to discuss state action requirement as a purely le­
gal doctrine and consider whether it is sufficiently grounded in the 
constitutional text or otherwise. To this Chemerinsky presents four 
answers. A textual justification of state action doctrine relies on the 
perception that the text of the U. S. Constitution “seems to limit its 
application to just the government. ” There are phrases like: “Con­
gress shall make no law... ” or "No state shall make or enforce any 
law... ” that may be read as directed only to the government. A his­
torical explanation lies with the common law. It was thought in the 
18th and 19th century that individuals are protected from private in­
fringements of their rights by the common law so no constitution­
al, horizontal protection was needed. Two policy rationales were also 
articulated by the Court. State action supposedly preserves an area of 
individual freedom and enhances federalism. 20
In spite of these explanations - which will be discussed shortly 
below - there is an overarching theme that runs throughout the evo­
lution of this doctrine. It can be called a theme of racial inequality or 
simply racism. The Justices of the Court used the state action doc­
trine as a convenient device in the process of taming of the Recon­
struction Amendments. Lewis H. LaRue remarked, that these Civil 
War amendments brought the norm of equality into the Constitution, 
but in 1873 in Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court began to in­
terpret equality back out of it and completed this process in 1896 in 
Plessy v. Ferguson. 21 This was the infamous case in which the Court 
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supported racial segregation. The Court in fact devised a “catch-22” 
reading of federalism that helped to undo civil rights enforcement 
after the Civil War. Authors of The Supreme Court. An Essential His­
tory explain it this way. In Hall v. DeCuir (1877) the Court struck 
down a Louisiana statute barring racial segregation on its common 
carriers (trains, boats etc.). The majority of the Court found that the 
state could not regulate its waterways, for steamboat travel was in­
terstate commerce, so only Congress could regulate it. This was the 
first prong of a very elegant tool. The second one was exposed in Civil 
Rights Cases: Congress could not act unless the offender was the state 
itself or its agents. “Thus private discrimination of all kinds must be 
left to the state to remedy. But the state could not legislate against 
those forms of discrimination touching interstate commerce because 
Congress had exclusive jurisdiction.”22 Francisco M. Ugarte has deliv­
ered a powerful argument that state action doctrine was grounded in 
racism and noted that Civil Rights Cases alongside Plessy v. Fergusson 
“were instrumental in the creation of a new legal regime that (...) es­
tablished and perpetuated racial subordination throughout nearly all 
elements of American society.”23 These maneuvers of the Court were 
actually largely applauded not only in the South. Since 1873 there was 
a feeling of general apathy towards Reconstruction and a growing im­
patience with the use of national authority to protect the colored race. 
When the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (in Civil Rights 
Cases) the press almost uniformly cheered the Court’s decision.24
22 P. Ch. Hoffer, W. Hoffer, N.E.H. Hull, The Supreme Court. An Essential 
History, Lawrence 2007, p. 142.
23 F.M. Ugarte, “Reconstruction Redux...”, p. 484.
24 See B. Friedman, The Will of the People. How Public Opinion Has Influenced 
the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, New York 2010, 
pp. 145-149.
25 See E. Chemerinsky, "Rethinking State Action”, p. 510.
The results of the doctrine were nothing short of remarkable. 
The courts tolerated the violation of virtually every constitutional 
value because of the absence of state action.25 In the year of 2000 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Morrison called it “the 
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time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very 
terms, prohibits only state action.”26 It would be an understatement 
to say that this view and reverence for this “time honored principle” 
has not been universally shared. Charles L. Black, Jr famously excori­
ated the doctrine calling it “a conceptual disaster area” in 1967. Since 
he saw it as a doctrine without shape or line, he added that the whole 
thing - by which he meant the jurisprudence of the Court regard­
ing this issue - “has the flavor of a torchless search for a way out of 
a damp echoing cave.”27 Black’s bitter quip about a “conceptual disas­
ter area” was repeated by many scholars who were unable to make 
any sense of the Supreme Court’s endeavors in this field, at least in 
its legal dimension. In a more recent article Julie K. Brown conclud­
ed that the current state of affairs requires decluttering the state ac­
tion doctrine by the Supreme Court because it is “slowly descending 
into utter confusion where private parties remain unaware of what 
conduct subjects them to Constitutional restriction, and courts are 
unclear as to the appropriate state action standard.”28
26 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
27 Ch.L. Black Jr, “The Supreme Court 1966 Term - Foreword: ‘State Action’,
Equal Protection, and California Proposition 14”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 81 
(1967), p. 95.
28 J.K. Brown, "Less is More...”, p. 581.
29 M.J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: the Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality, Oxford 2004, p. 215.
Much more clear is the sociopolitical context of relevance of the 
state action doctrine. In the 1940s, national civil rights conscious­
ness crystallized in the United States. Many adhered to the view ex­
pressed in the words of a newspaper article of the time: "a nation 
that has poured out its blood and treasure in a war billed as a contest 
against racism can hardly afford the luxury of forcing its own citi­
zens to live in ghettos.”29 Mark A. Graber rightly observed that after 
that period, when an increased number of racial egalitarians gained 
political power during the third quarter of the 20th century the major­
ities in the Supreme Court (under Chief Justice Vinson’s and Chief 
Justice Warren’s leadership) “consistently found state action in cir­
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cumstances where nineteenth-century justices saw only private racial 
discrimination.”50 Later, however, the impetus behind the rights rev­
olution dissipated and with Nixon’s judicial appointments the conve­
niently fuzzy state action doctrine regained its prominence.
50 M.A. Graber, "Subtraction by Addition?...”, pp. 1544-1545.
51 See E. Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action”, pp. 520-522.
52 D.P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 
1789-1888, Chicago 1985, p. 397.
53 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
34 M. Piechowiak, Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich
międzynarodowej ochrony [Philosophy of Human Rights: Human Rights in the
It should be firmly stated that the state action doctrine is 
a unique invention of the Justices of the Supreme Court. Its tex­
tual basis is weak. The Fourteenth Amendment does not contain 
a threshold requirement of demonstrating “state action,” absence of 
which makes legal all private infringements of fundamental rights. 
Chemerinsky advances a convincing argument that this is a misinter­
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the key issue is whether 
a state deprived someone of a guaranteed right. If a state fails to stop 
private violations of liberty and equality or denies redress for viola­
tions, a state denies and deprives its citizens of rights and equality.51 
Historically speaking, argues David P. Currie, a strong argument can 
be made, on the basis of the origins of the equal protection clause, 
that private lynching was among the evils that Congress was meant 
to have power to forbid. The very failure of the states to protect blacks 
prompted the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 53Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases, correctly 
decried the majority’s narrow reading of this Amendment with the 
words: “The substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the 
Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal 
criticism.”55 In fact, as a Polish scholar, Marek Piechowiak noted, 
the state action requirement is a kind of legal fiction. The Supreme 
Court firstly balances the competing rights and only then if the result 
is in favor of the petitioner, does it decide the Court decides that the 
violator’s action satisfies the state action requirement.54 Cass R. Sun- 
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stein makes a similar claim in saying that state action is always pres­
ent and the real question involves the meaning of the relevant con­
stitutional guarantees.35 Elsewhere, this author takes his argument 
further by observing that the state action inquiry is not a search for 
whether the state has “acted,” but it is “an examination of whether it 
has deviated from functions that are perceived as normal and desir­
able under the relevant constitutional provision.”36
Light of their International Protection], Lublin 1999, p. 160 (Prace Wydziału 
Filozoficznego / Towarzystwo Nukowe KUL, 81).
’5 See C.R. Sunstein, “State Action is Always Present”, Chicago Journal ofi 
International Law, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2002), p. 465.
J6 Idem, The Partial Constitution, Cambridge 1993, p. 74.
The traditional common law explanation is no longer valid and 
was not really valid in the 19th century when the Civil War Amend­
ments were adopted. In the era of racial segregation the civil rights of 
black Americans were not protected by common law. Nowadays, the 
protection offered by common law seems to be inadequate, especially 
in the era of the Internet and the ubiquity of social media.
Amid the criticism of the state action doctrine Stephen Gard- 
baum’s argument stands out and sheds light not only on the issue 
whether private actions are subject to constitutional constraints. His 
reasoning illuminates also, more generally, the problem of the hor­
izontal effect of constitutional rights in countries that do not adopt 
the doctrine (or rather “anti-doctrine”) of state action. A very short 
summary of Gardbaum’s argument runs as follows. The axiom of 
the state action doctrine does not resolve the issue of defining the 
scope of application of constitutional rights. The answer lies in the 
Supremacy Clause which renders all law directly subject to the Con­
stitution. Private actors are not directly bound by the Constitution 
but individual rights provisions govern their legal relations with each 
other. Whenever the constitutionality of a law invoked in litigation 
between private actors is challenged, there should be no threshold 
issue of state action. There is just the substantive issue of whether 
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that law violates the Constitution.37 Private actors are unable to rely 
on an unconstitutional law in any ordinary, nonconstitutional cause 
of action. However, and by contrast, there can be no constitutional 
cause of action against a private actor for breach of a constitutional 
duty, because private actors have none. Actions by private actors are 
immune from constitutional scrutiny only if they do not rely on any 
law or if the victim has no relevant cause of action.38 An example 
is given of a black beggar that has no common law tort or statutory 
cause of action to challenge the property law of a racist donor who 
gives change only to white beggars. Let us consider another exam­
ple: breach of promise. Common law action for breach of a promise 
to marry was used from the 17th century, predominantly by women. 
Since the 1930s many states, but not all of them, have enacted statu­
tes that abolished this type of action. In light of Gardbaum's thesis, 
one can argue that in those American jurisdictions which retain the 
breach of promise action it would be possible to invoke constitutional 
rights during proceedings before a court of law although plaintiff and 
defendant are private persons. Yet, in those states that do not allow 
a lawsuit to be brought for a breach of promise, no constitutional 
reservations concerning this private issue can be raised. Since a su­
premacy clause is usually found in many modem constitutions, it 
is indeed promising to analyze this way a given country's position 
on the scope of constitutional rights and their impact on private ac­
tors. According to Gardbaum’s analysis the United States take no less 
a horizontal position than Germany, for in both countries constitu­
tional rights directly govern all private law and so indirectly govern 
private actors.39
37 S. Gardbaum, “The ‘Horizontal Effec’ of Constitutional Rights”, Michigan 
Law Review, Vol. 102 (December 2003), pp. 390-391.
38 Ibid., pp. 420-422.
39 Idem, “The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptional­
ism”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 107, No. 3 (December 2008), p. 437.
I have emphasized here the connection between the state ac­
tion doctrine and racial inequality. Racial segregation and discrim­
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ination was facilitated and promoted by the Supreme Court’s deci­
sions. Over the last few decades the state action doctrine has taken 
on a new significance in the Internet era. Major Internet companies 
are U.S.-based and privately held. They provide services for billions 
of consumers worldwide. The traditional way of thinking tied to the 
axiom of state action makes this ever-growing sphere of interactions 
immune from constitutional scrutiny. Paul Schiff Berman warned, 
as early as in 2000, that all of cyberspace may become an effectively 
private, Constitution-free zone.40 The same term was used in 2014 by 
Benjamin F. Jackson who wrote that social network websites are "es­
sentially Constitution-free zones where the threat of censorship, both 
overt and subtle, looms large.” The reason for this is the state action 
doctrine that causes a lack of constitutional protection of communi­
cations on social network websites.41
40 See P.S. Berman, "Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural 
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to ‘Private’ Regulation”, University of 
Colorado Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4 (May 2000), p. 1263.
41 B.F. Jackson, "Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Face­
book", New Mexico Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2014), p. 166.
At least three general conclusions come to mind, none of which 
are particularly reassuring. First, the state action doctrine creates 
considerable problems both in the judiciary and the academy. It is 
because serious challenges of civil rights abuses in a modern state 
are tackled with îc^-century doctrine grounded in racism that was 
devised as an answer to a seismic shift in the U.S. legal system fol­
lowing the Civil War. This approach seems to be wrong or at least 
strikingly outdated.
Second, struggles with regard to the state action requirement 
show, in a more methodological register, how an unwise and perni­
cious doctrine may obscure the dilemmas of justice that courts and 
scholars face. The importance attached to this doctrine requires that 
the rights of a private violator should always be favored over the 
rights of a private victim. Let us consider the acerbic words of Er­
win Chemerinsky who in 1985 reminded that during the 1950s and 
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1960s state action had attracted probably the most attention in law 
review articles. Some years later this attention largely disappeared. 
In Chemerinsky’s opinion, earlier commentators were successful in 
demonstrating the incoherence of the state action doctrine and in ar­
guing that this concept could never be rationally or consistently ap­
plied. Despite the criticism, the Supreme Court steadfastly enforced 
its requirement of state action. Thus, explains Chemerinsky, “there 
was seemingly no direction for scholarship about state action; mak­
ing sense of the concept of state action was perceived as impossible, 
and arguing for its elimination was considered futile.”42 This pow­
erful critique of the Court has lost none of its relevance and force. 
The state action doctrine still hampers the systematic protection of 
constitutional rights.
42 E. Chemerinsky, "Rethinking State Action”, pp. 504-505.
43 M. Florczak-Wątor, Horyzontalny wymiar praw konstytucyjnych (‘Horizon­
tal Dimension of Constitutional Rights’), Kraków 2014, p. 417.
Third, there is a lesson to be learned from the way the scope 
of constitutional rights is understood in the United States. The in­
ability of American courts to sufficiently protect constitutional rights 
against private intrusions raises the question of the real role of the 
rights enshrined in the Constitution. One answer may be that they 
should protect individual autonomy. In that case it does not matter 
who the violator is and it is nonsensical to require a finding of state 
action. This means that at least the indirect horizontal effect of consti­
tutional rights must be accepted. I share the view expressed by Mon­
ika Florczak-Wqtor that in a modern democratic state the conduct of 
private actors may be the biggest threat to constitutional rights and 
liberties; therefore a horizontal effect of constitutional rights is indis­
pensable to their protection.43 Another answer is that constitutional 
rights are only a kind of constitutional badge of decency. They apply 
only to limit the government, whereas nongovernmental violations 
of individual rights may well be tolerated. The second answer fits pre­
cisely the U.S. position and it partially explains why the United States 
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is increasingly out of sync with an evolving global consensus on is­
sues of human rights.44
44 See extended discussion of whether (and why) the United States is a con­
stitutional outlier in D.S. Law, M. Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the 
United States Constitution”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 
(June 2012), p. 762.
STRESZCZENIE
Powszechna i obowiązująca poprzez orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego in­
terpretacja Konstytucji USA opiera się na tezie, że zasadniczo akt ten nie 
reguluje relacji pomiędzy podmiotami prywatnymi. Istotnym wyjątkiem 
jest Trzynasta Poprawka, która zakazuje całkowicie niewolnictwa, także 
w relacjach prywatnych. Główną konstytucyjną normą stosowaną do oce­
ny skuteczności norm konstytucyjnych w relacjach między podmiotami 
prywatnymi jest Czternasta Poprawka, nakazująca m.in. prawidłowe sto­
sowanie prawa (due proces of law) oraz równą ochronę prawną. Od 1883 
r. Sąd Najwyższy rozwija na tle tego przepisu doktrynę state action, przez 
pryzmat której ocenia się skuteczność norm konstytucyjnych względem 
podmiotów prywatnych.
Doktryna ta oznacza, że zachowanie o całkowicie prywatnym charak­
terze nie podlega ocenie sądów względem zgodności z Konstytucją. Pod­
mioty prywatne powołujące się na naruszenie ich konstytucyjnych praw 
mogą domagać się ochrony sądowej wyłącznie w przypadku wykazania, 
że spełniony jest wymóg state action, działania władz. Prywatne narusze­
nia praw konstytucyjnych mogą wywołać reakcję sądową, jeśli powodowi 
uda się wykazać, że dokonywane są one przy współdziałaniu władz pań­
stwowych (na dowolnym poziomie, w szczególności władz stanowych lub 
federalnych). Sąd Najwyższy wyraźnie formułuje w swym orzecznictwie 
tezę, że Konstytucja nie chroni przed czysto prywatnymi zachowaniami 
naruszającymi prawa konstytucyjne, w tym przed prywatną dyskryminacją.
Doktryna state action jest wytworem Sądu Najwyższego, który w ten 
sposób sprzeciwiał się zmianom w prawie dokonanym w następstwie woj­
ny secesyjnej. Zasadnie można twierdzić, że doktryna ta ma rasistowską 
genezę, a rozwijający ją sędziowie Sądu Najwyższego stworzyli podstawy 
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prawne dla obowiązującego do połowy XX w. systemu segregacji rasowej. 
Doktryna stałe action jest wyjątkowym, bo nadal obowiązującym, reliktem 
rasistowskiej interpretacji Konstytucji. Jej podstawa normatywna jest nad 
wyraz wątła, tekst Konstytucji nie wprowadza wymogu wykazania działa­
nia władz na potrzeby ochrony praw konstytucyjnych. Interpretacja histo­
ryczna prowadzi raczej do tezy, że twórcy Czternastej Poprawki pragnęli 
zapobiec prywatnym naruszeniom prawa, takim jak lincze na ludności 
czarnej.
W kolejnych dekadach rozumienie doktryny stałe action zależało od 
postawy ideologicznej większości sędziów Sądu Najwyższego. W latach 
40. i 50. straciła ona na znaczeniu, Sąd Najwyższy reagował na narusze­
nia praw konstytucyjnych, ale od prezydentury Richarda Nixona przewagę 
w Sądzie zyskali przeciwnicy egzekwowania Konstytucji w relacjach pry­
watnych. Wymóg wykazania działania władz jest bardzo dogodnym narzę­
dziem, za pośrednictwem którego sędziowie uchylają się od oceny naru­
szeń praw konstytucyjnych, toteż doktryna stałe action ponownie stała się 
poglądem ustrojowym o podstawowym znaczeniu. Po dziś dzień stanowi 
ona skuteczną barierę przed stosowaniem Konstytucji w relacjach prywat­
nych. Jednocześnie trzeba podkreślić, że ta wychwalana w orzecznictwie 
Sądu doktryna jest niezwykle krytycznie oceniana przez wielu przenikli­
wych badaczy prawa amerykańskiego, takich jak Erwin Chemerinsky, Cass 
R. Sunstein czy Stephen Gardbaum. Uważa się ją za „obszar klęski poję­
ciowej”, nie sposób bowiem racjonalnie przedstawić jej treści. Przez wiele 
lat w drugiej połowie XX w. doktryna ta uważana była za naczelny problem 
w amerykańskim prawie konstytucyjnym, ale wobec nieugiętej postawy 
Sądu Najwyższego zainteresowanie tym zagadnieniem osłabło, uznano 
bowiem, że nie można nadać tej doktrynie spójności ani wskazać, w jaki 
sposób można ją konsekwentnie stosować.
W ramach akademickich prób zwalczania doktryny state action przy­
toczyć można skrótowo pogląd C.R. Sunsteina, według którego wymóg 
działania państwa jest w kontekście ochrony praw konstytucyjnych zawsze 
spełniony, a także rozbudowaną koncepcję S. Gardbauma, który wykazu­
je, że właściwa interpretacja amerykańskiej Konstytucji powinna opierać 
się na klauzuli jej nadrzędności. Skoro wszystkie przepisy obowiązujące 
w systemie prawnym USA podlegają ocenie co do zgodności z Konstytucją, 
jeśli w postępowaniu o ochronę praw konstytucyjnych przed prywatnym 
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naruszeniem, podniesiony zostanie zarzut, że pozwalające na takie naru­
szenie przepisy są niezgodne z Konstytucją, sądy nie powinny, zdaniem 
S. Gardbauma, domagać się spełnienia wymogu działania państwa, ale 
merytorycznie oceniać zaskarżone przepisy. W tej alternatywnej koncepcji, 
w Stanach Zjednoczonych mówić należy o pośredniej horyzontalnej sku­
teczności praw konstytucyjnych.
Współcześnie doktryna state action nabiera nowego znaczenia w erze 
Internetu. Ponieważ główne przedsiębiorstwa internetowe, dostarczające 
usługi dla miliardów użytkowników na całym świecie, są przedsiębior­
stwami prywatnymi, trafnie stwierdza się, że z powodu tej doktryny Inter­
net jest strefą wolną od Konstytucji.
W podsumowaniu można wyrazić trzy tezy. Doktryna state action wy­
wołuje zasadnicze problemy w orzecznictwie i sferach akademickich, po­
nieważ naruszenia praw człowieka w państwie współczesnym ocenia się 
według rasistowskiej koncepcji stworzonej przez Sąd Najwyższy w XIX w. 
Ponadto, doświadczenia z doktryną state action pokazują, jak szkodliwe po­
glądy zrodzone w orzecznictwie mogą skutecznie utrudniać ochronę praw 
konstytucyjnych.
Na tle rozumienia zakresu praw konstytucyjnych w Stanach Zjed­
noczonych i wycofania się sądów z ochrony praw przed naruszeniami 
prywatnymi, można wreszcie postawić pytanie o to, jaka jest rzeczywista 
rola praw konstytucyjnych. W przypadku uznania, że mają one chronić 
autonomię jednostki, nie ma znaczenia, kto dokonuje naruszeń takich 
praw, więc należy zaakceptować co najmniej pośrednią horyzontalną sku­
teczność praw konstytucyjnych. Odpowiedź na to pytanie udzielana przez 
amerykański Sąd Najwyższy, sugeruje, że prawa konstytucyjne są jedynie 
oznaką przyzwoitości - ograniczają one działania władz, ale naruszenia 
praw przez podmioty niepaństwowe są tolerowane.
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